

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00074 01 OF 03 261922Z

44

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-11 L-03

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0074

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET

REPS ON FEBRUARY 25, 1976

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN BILATERAL DISCUSSION FEBRUARY 25
WITH US REP AND DEPREP, SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SHUSTOV
STRESSED SERIOUSNESS TOP SOVIET LEADERS ATTACHED TO RECENT
EASTERN PROPOSAL, EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT EXCESSIVELY
NEGATIVE WESTERN REACTION MIGHT CAUSE THESE LEADERS TO
BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, AND
CLAIMED WITHOUT GIVING FURTHER SUBSTANTIATION THAT THEIR
PROPOSAL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A BUILDING BLOCK FOR
FINAL SOLUTION, AND ARGUED FOR CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00074 01 OF 03 261922Z

OF FORCE DEFINITIONS. KHLESTOV ALSO ASKED A QUESTION ABOUT

THE MODALITIES OF POSSIBLE DATA EXCHANGE, AT THE SAME TIME STATING THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT HAD NOT CHANGED. END SUMMARY.

2. US REP OPENED DISCUSSION BY SAYING KHLESTOV HAD ONCE AGAIN SUGGESTED TO US DEPREP THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SOME PRACTICAL STEP COULD BE FOUND TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD. US REPS AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE AND ADKED WHAT KHLESTOV HAD IN MIND.

3. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT HE DID THINK IT WAS USEFUL TO DISCUSS WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. MOSCOW WOULD LIKE FORWARD MOVEMENT. SOVIET LEADERS ATTACHED GREAT SIMPORTANTANCE TO THE VIENNA TALKS AND THEY THOUGHT A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT SHOULD TAKE PLACE. PROCEEDING FROM THIS DESIRE, SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD WORKED OUT THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL. BUT HE WISHED TO STRESS THAT NO ONE IN MOSCOW THOUGHT THAT ONLY THE SOCIALISTS COUNTRIES OR ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD MAKE THE ONLY CONCESSIONS. NOT ONLY THE SOVIETS, BUT ALSO THE WEST SHOULD WORK TOWARD MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT BE TO THE DETRIMENT OF ANY COUNTRY.

4. KHLESTOV SAID IT WAS THE SINCERE BELIEF OF SOVIET LEADERS THAT THE PROPOSAL THE EAST HAD JUST TABLED PROVIDED THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING SOLUTIONS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. HE WISHED TO STRESS THIS PROPOSAL WAS A VERY SERIOUS STEP WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DIRECTLY BY THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE LATTER HAD DECIDED ON THIS STEP MAINLY MOTIVATED BY THEIR DESIRE TO MEET THE US REQUIREMENT TO START WITH THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES.

5. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, HE WISHED TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF US REPS TO TWO FACTORS: SOVIET REPS HAD GAINED A FEELING THAT THE WEST WISHED TO DIMINISH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN IT. IT WOULD BE A NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT IF WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUED TO FOLLOW THIS LINE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00074 01 OF 03 261922Z

BECAUSE SOVIET LEADERS SINCERELY BELIEVED THERE WERE A NUMBER OF NEW ELEMENTS IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE BAD TO EXPRESS SUCH A NEGATIVE RESPONSE IN SUCH A DIRECT WAY BECAUSE SOVIET LEADERS MIGHT GET DIS-ILLUSIONED SINCE THEY WANTED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS.

6. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, VIEWED OBJECTIVELY, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS THE EAST HAD TAKEN OVER FROM THE WESTERN PO-

SITION. THIS WAS A FACT BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WERE VERY WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE WESTERN POSITION. THIRDLY, AN ASPECT OF EVERY PROPOSAL, INCLUDING THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL, WAS THAT IT SHOULD SERVE THE FORWARD DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS SENSE, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL CONTAINED THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON A FIRST REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES. TO BE COMPLETELY FRANK, THE MAIN REASON THE SOVIETS HAD DECIDED TO START A FIRST STAGE WITH A REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES WAS THE SOVIET DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US. THE SOVIETS HAD UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT ON THE SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT, ESPECIALLY FOR THE US. NOW, THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO TAKE THIS COURSE. IT WAS NATURAL THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NOT AGREE TO REDUCE ONLY US AND SOVIET FORCES WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OTHERS. THE REASONS FOR THIS WERE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL. US REPS KNEW THEM WELL. SOVIET REPS THEMSELVES HAD BEEN DISILLUSIONED WITH THE INITIAL WESTERN REACTION. BUT THE WORST ASPECT OF THIS REACTION WAS THAT SOVIET LEADERS MIGHT GET DISSUASIONED AND THIS WOULD NOT BE A FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR ANY NEGOTIATION. THAT WAS WHY HE WISHED TO EXPRESS THE WISH THAT WESTERN REPS WOULD PAY SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL SINCE ITS MOTIVE WAS A SINCERE DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS.

7. KHESTOV SAID SOVIET REPS REALLY DID CONSIDER THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN POSSIBILITIES TO AGREE ON A REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST, BUT WITH THE ADDITION OF CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS. AFTER ALL, THESE WERE MULTI-LATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. ONE MUST ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE CORE OF NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WERE THE FRG TROOPS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00074 01 OF 03 261922Z

8. SHUSTOV ADDED THAT SOVIETS CONSIDERED THEIR NEW PROPOSAL ADDED A CERTAIN BUILDING BLOCK TOWARDS A FUTURE AGREEMENT. SOVIETS CONSIDERED THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 16 ALSO ADDED AN ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCK TOWARDS AGREEMENT. ONE COULD NOT REACH AN AGREEMENT IN A SINGLE MOVE; THE POSSIBLE COMPONENTS HAD TO BE WORKED OUT PROGRESSIVELY. THERE WERE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL WHICH JUSTIFIED CALLING IT A BUILDING BLOCK. THE MOST IMPORTANT WAS THE IDEA OF WORKING OUT US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS FIRST WITH CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS FOR THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. SOME WESTERN PARTICIPANTS' REPRESENTATIVES WERE ALREADY PICTURING THE SITUATION IN EXTREMELY BLACK TERMS. SOME HAD EVEN SAID THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE ON A FREEZE FOR BOTH SIDES AT THE PRESENT NUMERICAL LEVEL OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THEN LEAVE THE

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00074 02 OF 03 262015Z

41

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0074

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

NEGOTIATIONS TO WIND DOWN. THIS ATTITUDE WAS UNPRODUCTIVE AND REFLECTED A NEGATIVE POSITION TOWARDS THE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. US REP SAID KHLESTOV'S FIRST POINT HAD BEEN THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY UP TO THE EAST TO MOVE BUT TO BOTH SIDES. WESTERN REPS RECOGNIZED THIS. THIS WAS WHY THE WEST HAD MOVED IN ITS DECEMBER PROPOSAL WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AFTER LENGTHY CONSULTATION WITH THE NATO ALLIES AND CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF DIFFICULTY. ONE WESTERN MOTIVE HAD BEEN TO TRY TO MAKE A CONCEPTUAL BRIDGE BETWEEN THE CENTRAL POINTS OF VIEW TAKEN BY THE WEST AND THE EAST. US REP SAID HE WOULD RETURN TO THIS POINT. KHLESTOV HAD SAID SOVIET LEADERS WANTED MOVEMENT IN THE VIENNA TALKS. US REP WAS GLAD TO HEAR THIS. US LEADERS ALSO WANTED MOVEMENT. KHLESTOV HAD ALSO SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH WESTERN REACTION TO THE NEW

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00074 02 OF 03 262015Z

EASTERN PROPOSAL AND THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE CONCENTRATING ON AN ATTEMPT TO SHOW THIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT. THIS WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE CONTINUING TO STUDY THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WITH A CONSTRUCTIVE INTENT, IN ORDER TO TRY TO FIND A WAY TO MAKE IT A BUILDING BLOCK, AS HUSTOV HAD CALLED IT. IN FACT, THE WEST WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO MAKE THIS PROPOSAL A BUILDING BLOCK. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, WESTERN REPS HAD TO LOOK AT IT OBJECTIVELY AND REALISTICALLY AND TO TRY TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH MOVEMENT IT REASSY REPRESENTED.

10. US REP CONTINUED THAT IT WAS CENTRAL IN THIS CONTEXT TO COMPARE THE NEW PROPOSAL WITH THE EASTERN INITIAL STEP REDUCTION PROPOSAL WHICH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD PUT FORWARD SOME TIME AGO AND TO TRY TO SEE HOW FAR THE NEW PROPOSAL MOVED BEYOND THE INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL. SPEAKING CANDIDLY, US REPS REALLY COULD NOT YET SEE THAT THE NEW PROPOSAL WAS A SIGNICANT MOVE BEYOND THE FIRST STEP PROPOSAL.

11. US REP SAID PERHAPS KHLESTOV MIGHT BETTER UNDERSTANDING THE POINT HE HAD JUST MADE IF HE CONTINUED ON TO HIS NEXT POINT. KHLESTOV HAD SAID ONE PURPOSE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS TO ESTABLISH BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION. THIS WAS A GOOD OBJECTIVE AND HE HOPED THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE PURSUED BY BOTH SIDES. BUT TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET OFFICIALS SHOULD BE CLEAR AS TO WHAT THE US FEELS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM PARTICIPANTS MUST DEAL WITH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS FAR AS US REPS WERE CONCERNED, THE REALLY CRITICAL PROBLEM WAS THE INEQUALITY OF GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. IT WAS A SIMPLE FACT THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES COULD NOT SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHICH CONTRACTUALIZED THAT DISPARITY.

12. US REP SAID HE ASSUMED KHLESTOV UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT AND THAT IT WAS NOT MERE RHETORIC, BUT THE REAL SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATING PROBLEM AS WESTERN REPS SAW IT. BY THE SAME TOKEN, US REPS RECOGNIZED THAT, FOR THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00074 02 OF 03 262015Z

SOVIETS, THE IDEA THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD OBTAIN A UNI-

LATERAL ADVANTAGE WAS THE CARINAL PROBLEM. THIS WAS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER FOR THE US AND THE WEST ALSO. US REP HAD HEARD SOVIET REPS WHEN THEY SAID THAT WHAT THEY CALLED THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WITH RESPECT TO THE AREA SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED AND THEY HAD TAKEN THIS POINT VERY MUCH INTO ACCOUNT IN MAKING THE DECEMBER 16 WESTERN PROPOSAL.

13. US DEPREP SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY FAIR TO SAY THAT US REPS CONSIDERED SOVIET ARGUMENTS ON THIS POINT TO BE SOMEWHAT ARTIFICIAL. SOVIET REPS JUSTIFIED THEIR POSITION ON NOT CHANGING THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP INDIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS BY CLAIMING THAT THIS FORCE RELATIONSHIP HAD KEPT THE PEACE IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD. BUT WHATEVER MIGHT BE SAID ABOUT FORCE RELATIONSHIPS KEEPING THE PEACE, THIS ARGUMENT CLEARLY PERTAINED ONLY TO THE OVERALL FORCE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND NOT TO THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP WITHIN A SMALL, ARTIFICIALLY-DEFINED AREA. HOWEVER, US REPS REALIZED THAT THIS POINT WAS HIGHLY IMPORTANT POLITICAL POINT FOR THE SOVIETS AND WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS AND RECOGNIZED IT AS SUCH.

14. US REP SAID THAT IN THIS SENSE THE US REPS HAD TAKEN SERIOUSLY THE SOVIET POSTION THAT THE WESTERN POSITION PRIOR TO THE DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE THE WEST UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND WAS NOT EQUITABLE. THE WEST HAD SEEN THAT THERE WAS A PRACTICAL POLITICAL PROBLEM; HOW DID ONE ACCOMMODATE TWO DIVERGENT BUT FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS, ONE THAT THERE MUST BE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND SECONS, THAT THE OVERALL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED? IT WAS TO MEET THIS PROBLEM THAT THE US HAD GAINED ALLIED AGREEMENT TO GO ALONG WITH A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

15. US REP SAID THAT IT HAD ALSO BEEN AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC NEGOTIATING PROBLEM THAT WESTERN REPS HAD VIEWED THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL. THEY HAD TWO DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS PROPOSAL. FIRST, IT DID NOT SEEM TO THEM TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO CENTRAL POSITIONS OR EVEN TO ADDRESS THE TASK OF BRIDGING THAT GAP. THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00074 02 OF 03 262015Z

PROPOSAL DID REPRESENT MOVEMENT IN THE SENSE OF BEING LIMITED TO USF AND SOVIET REDICTIONS BUT DID NOT GO SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND THE FIRST STEP PROPOSAL IN THIS REGARD. THE ISSUE OF SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS WAS AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM. BUT IT WAS NOT THE BASIC PROBLEM OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. SHUSTOV HAD JUST REFERRED TO THE DARK VIEW THAT SOME ALLIES EXPRESSED TO HIM ABOUT THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE EXVLANATION LAY IN THE FACT

THAT THE ALLIES FELT STRONGLY ABOUT REDUCING AND LIMITING
WESTERN NUCLEAR CAPACITY AND FELT THE DECEMBER 16 MOVE
WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. THEY HAD MEASURED THE RECENT
SOVIET MOVE AGAINST THE DECEMBER 16 MOVE AND CONSIDERED
THAT IT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE APPRECIATION OF THE

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00074 03 OF 03 262112Z

62

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-11 L-03

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USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0074

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

IMPORTANCE OF THE WESTERN MOVE. ONE EFFECT OF ALL OF THIS WAS
THAT PEOPLE IN THE WEST WERE ALREADY SKEPTICAL ABOUT
THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN CONFIRMED IN THEIR
VIEWS BY THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL.

16. US DEPREP SAID THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE DID NOT
BELIEVE THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF
TIME AT THEIR DISPOSAL. SUPPORT FOR THE VIENNA
NEGOTIATIONS BY POLITICAL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN WESTERN

EUROPE HAD DECREASED AND THIS TREND CONTINUED. THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL HAD INTENSIFIED RATHER THAN COUNTERED THIS TENDENCY.

17. KHLESTOV SAID TO THIS HE WOULD ONLY SAY THAT, BEING WELL AWARE OF THE ORIGINAL WESTERN APPROACH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00074 03 OF 03 262112Z

HE COULD UNDERSTAND QUITE WELL THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT THE DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL REFLECTED A POSITIVE CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION. HE RECOGNIZED THIS FACT. BUT HE WISHED TO SAY THAT THOSE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WHO EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LATEST EASTERN PROPOSAL WERE NOT SINCERE. TO HIM, THESE VIEWS SEEMED MORE TO BE A TACTICAL MOVE WHICH SEEMED TO BE A PROPAGANDA ACTION AND AIMED AT CREATING PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS. IN CASE SOME PARTICIPANTS STARTED TO DEVELOP IDEAS OF THIS KIND, IT WOULD NOT SERVE THE NEGOTIATIONS. NATURALLY, SOVIET REPS THEMSELVES WERE NOT AFFECTED BY SUCH MOODS. BUT THERE MIGHT BE SOME PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE EFFECTED BY THEM IN EASTERN CAPITALS AND HE DID NOT THINK THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD HELP THE NEGOTIATIONS.

18. KHLESTOV SAID REGARDING US REP'S IMPORTANT COMMENT ABOUT RECONCILING VIEWS ON GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES AND THE EASTERN DISIRE NOT TO CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA, THE WEST HAD IN FACT SUGGESTED INCLUDING IN REDUCTIONS PART OF THE AMERICAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA. BUT IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS THAT REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND THE REDUCTION OF PART OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE ABSOLUTELY NOT EQUAL TO ONE ANOTHER.

19. KHLESTOV SAID HE COULD DEVELOP THIS POINT AND GIVE ARGUMENTS WHY THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, BUT HE WOULD DO SO IN INFORMAL SESSIONS. INSTEAD, US AND SOVIET REPS SHOULD TRY TO FIND SOME FACTORS OR ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD ACTUALLY HELP MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE HAD ONE QUESTION. THE WEST WAS TRYING TO PROVE TO THE EAST THAT THERE WAS A DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. EASTERN REPS HAD IN THE PAST DENIED THE ACCURACY OF THE WESTERN FIGURES. BUT WESTERN REPS INSISTED ON IT. GIVEN THIS FACT, HE WISHED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINT: AS US REPS KNEW, THE WEST WAS INCLUDING IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CERTAIN FORCE ELEMENTS WHICH THEY HAD ALLOCATED IN THE WEST TO THE WESTERN AIR FORCES. THIS WAS A FACT. NONETHELESS, AT THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, THE FRG REP HAD SPOKEN OF A DISPARITY OF 150,000 MEN, THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00074 03 OF 03 262112Z

SAME DISPARITY THE WEST HAD CLAIMED AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE WEST HAD ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH ITS ALLOCATION OF FORCES AS REGARDS THE EAST, WHY DIDN'T THE WEST MOVE TO SETTLE THIS QUESTION?

20. US REP SAID THE WEST WAS READY TO MOVE TO SOLVE THE ISSUE IF THE EAST WOULD GIVE THE DATA. KHLESTOV SAID HE REALIZED SOME WESTERNERS BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT CLAIM THAT THE FORCES INVOLVED IN THE REALLOCATION WERE HUGE. US REP SAID THE WEST ALSO NEEDED OVERALL FIGURES. THIS WAS NEEDED TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE WEST THAT THE SOVIETS WERE TAKING THESE TALKS SERIOUSLY. THE ONE THING THAT WOULD DO MOST GOOD FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PRACTICAL SENSE WOULD BE TO PROVIDE THE FIGURES HE HAD DISCUSSED.

21. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD NOT REPEAT THE EASTERN POSITION AS REGARDS DATA. BUT IT WOULD HELP HIM TO UNDERSTAND THE WESTERN APPROACH TO DATA BETTER IF US REPS WOULD COMMENT ON ONE POINT: WHEN WEST SAID THERE WERE 777,000 NATO FORCES, THIS WAS A VERY EXACT FIGURE. HE WAS NO EXPERT, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD IT WAS OFTEN VERY DIFFICULT TO CALCULATE FORCES IN THIS WAY. WHAT DID THIS FIGURE MEAN? AS OF WHAT DATE WAS IT VALID? HOW DID IT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CHANGES IN FORCE LEVELS WHICH RESULTED FROM CALLING UP CONSCRIPTS? HOW DID THE WEST DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES?

22. US REP SAID THESE WERE SERIOUS QUESTIONS. WESTERN REPS WERE PERFECTLY WILLING TO DISCUSS THEM THEN THEY HAD SOME FIGURES TO TALK ABOUT. WESTERN EXPERTS HAD ESTIMATED THEIBERS OF FORCES IN THE AREA TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITIES. HE WAS SURE THE FORCE LEVELS VARIED ON BOTH SIDES FROM TIME TO TIME, BUT, IN FORCES OF THE PRESENT TOTAL DIMENSIONS, THE FLUCTUATION UP AND DOWN WAS PROBABLY OF ABOUT THE SAME SCOPE. WESTERN FIGURES WERE GENERALLY COUNTED AT THE END OF THE CALENDAR YEAR.

23. US REP CONTINUED THAT ONE COULD NOT VERY WELL DISCUSS METHODS WITHOUT HAVING FIGURES. FOR PRACTICAL RESULTS, ONE SHOULD DISCUSS METHODS AND FIGURES AT THE SAME TIME. AFTER TWO-AND-ONE-HALF YEARS, THE BIG PROBLEM WAS STILL SUSPICION BETWEEN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00074 03 OF 03 262112Z

EAST AND WEST IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS UNDERSTANDABLE. THE THING WHICH WOULD DO THE MOST TO BUILD CONFIDENCE WOULD BE TO GET THE NUMBERS ON THE TABLE.

24. KHLESTOV THEN SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS. WITHOUT A DEFINITION, NOTHING PRACTICAL COULD BE DONE. PARTICIPANTS HAD TO AGREE ON WHO WAS INCLUDED AND WHO WAS EXCLUDED AND WHO WAS IN THE GROUND FORCES AND WHO WAS IN THE AIR FORCES. THERE WERE SOME COMMON ELEMENTS IN THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES AND HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTION TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOPIC IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS.

25. US REP SAID WEST WOULD BE GLAD IF SOVIETS TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO BRING IN NEW IDEAS ON THIS TOPIC AND TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. KHLESTOV ALREADY KNEW THE WESTERN POSITION. RESOR

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